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Communications Satellites-
Progress and the Road Ahead
Bernard G. Segal*
The development of satellites for intercontinental communications
is a "rapidly expanding field. The author here presents the basic tech-
nology of communications satellites, applicable legislation, and interna-
tional problems involved in order to provide a background with which
to understand future developments. The author explains the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962 which made possible the Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation, a "partnership" of government and private
enterprise, and destined to play a major role in a global communications
system. Finally, the author reviews the recent international agree-
ments under which the system will operate initially.
I. INTRODUCION
The declared policy of the United States is the establishment of a
global system of communications satellites which will serve our needs
and those of other countries, which will permit the participation of
all nations, and which will contribute to world peace and understand-
ing." Such a system, President Kennedy stated, is a vital element in
the march of civilization. 2
For lawyers to have a meaningful understanding of the develop-
ments in this new and important endeavor requires some understand-
ing of the basic technology of communications satellites, of applicable
Member, law firm of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania; chairman, Committee on Communications Satellites, World Peace Through Law
Center.
The author is indebted to his partner, Jerome J. Shestack, for very helpful assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. See Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Documents on Interna-
tional Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, S. Doc. No. 18,
88th Cong., 1st Sessf 14, 206, 208, 261-63 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Documents
on Outer Space]; Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Declaration of Policy and,
Purpose), 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1963).
2. Documents on Outer Space 316; White House Press Release, Aug. 31, 1962.
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legislation, and of the international problems involved. This article
will attempt to present at least the basic material necessary for such
comprehension.
II. TiH TECHNOLOGY
As the demand for radio communications services grows, it is neces-
sary to move to higher and higher frequencies to provide sufficient
channels to handle the transmissions. 3 Present overland television
and microwave services are transmitted over such high frequencies.
At these high frequencies, radio waves tend to travel in a straight
line, much in the manner of light. For this reason, after a relatively
short distance, the curvature of the earth interferes with the trans-
mission of these radio waves. Therefore, to transmit ultra high fre-
quency radio waves over long distances requires the use of relay
stations built within line of sight from one to another to carry the
signals around the curvature of the earth. These take the form of
relay towers, spaced some twenty to thirty miles apart, which now
cross the continent making it possible to have voice, record and tele-
vision signals span this entire territory.
Until the advent of communications satellites, there was no feasible
way to extend such a relay system across the oceans. To get a line
of sight across the Atlantic Ocean would require either the ordinary
relay towers, twenty to thirty miles apart, or a single relay tower over
475 miles high, both obviously impractical.
This is where the communications satellite comes in.4 A satellite
in orbit, thousands of miles above the North Atlantic, is high enough
to provide a direct line of sight between the United States and
Europe. It can relay microwave frequency signals in a single hop
3. A voice channel is a convenient measure of traffic which implies an information
band width of 3 kilocycles in each direction with certain well-known statistical char-
acteristics in both the time and the frequency domains. Typically, 22 telegraph or telex
channels equal 1 voice channel, and 600 2-way voice channels occupy space in the
spectrum equal to one TV channel.
4. For descriptions of the technical aspects of communications satellites and more
or less detailed statements of their history and how they operate, see the statement
of Dr. Elmer W. Engstrom, President of Radio Corporation of America, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, Public Policy Questions on the Ownership and Control of a Space Satellite
Communications System, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 121-31 (1961); Reiger, Nichols, Early
& Dews, Communications Satellites: Technology Economics and System Choices, The
Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-3487-RC (February 1963); PiRocEoINGs OF Tim
SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, SEATTLE, WASII-
INGTON (May 8-10, 1962), published by the Office of Science and Technical Informa-
tion, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) (SP-8, Nov. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as PRocIEDINcs]; FCC REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CARRIER COlMTrEE
IN Ts MATTER OF AN INQUIRY INTO THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY PRODLEMS
RELATING TO TIE AUTHORIZATION OF COMMERCIALLY OPERABLE SPACE COMMUNICA-
TIONS SYsTEms, FCC Doe. No. 14024 (Oct. 12, 1961) [hereinafter cited as REPORT oF
THE AD Hoc CARRIER COMMITTEE].
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across the ocean, performing the same function as relay stations or
cables. And since the number of channels which a satellite can
be expected to provide is very high, the satellite can be used not only
for telephone service but also for television and telex, teleprinter,
facsimiles, and other types of high-speed data transmissions.
A natural inquiry is whether such communications service cannot
be supplied entirely by cables. Until now the answer, as a practical
matter, has been in the negative. A single television signal would
occupy some six-hundred voice circuits, more than are now provided
by all the cables under the Atlantic Ocean. For this reason the
United States has been unable to televise live programs to Europe by
cable.
However, transistorized cables, which are under development by
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) will be
capable of accommodating a great many additional voice circuits.
For example, a trans-Atlantic transistorized cable could have a
capacity of as many as seven-hundred-twenty two-way telephone
grade circuits and could provide for the areas served by such cables
the various forms of telecommunications traffic which a satellite
system might serve. It has been suggested that although no transis-
torized cables are scheduled to be in operation by the end of 1965,
the potential of such cables may lessen the economic justification for
communications satellites. Contrariwise, it has been said that with
international television and the increasing use of broad band data
services making great demands on capacity, it would be simpler, more
efficient, and eventually less costly to use satellites rather than
cables. Further, advocates of the satellite communications develop-
ment predict that increased demand for voice and record communica-
tions would be almost certain to use up the total capacity of such a
new cable soon after its completion.5
In recent months AT&T made an important announcement that
should go a long way in allaying the fears of those who thought that
competition might be shaping up between the communications satel-
lite system and AT&T's new transoceanic cable. This was to the effect
that the company would prefer using satellite circuits to laying addi-
tional cables across the North Atlantic, if "suitable satellite facilities"
were ready on schedule, and that such preference would continue
5. For example, it has been estimated that from 1970 to 1980, the number of
circuits required for telecommunication facilities will triple. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
CAnIER COMMTTNEE 15; see also Jaffe, Smith & Attaway, The Impact of Commu-
nications Satellites on the Less Developed Areas, in UNITED STATES PAPERS PREPARED
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS, Vol. XII, Communications




until the cable and the satellite voice circuits serving the North
Atlantic routes were approximately equal in number.6
By now it can certainly be said that there is substantial agreement
that, even with improvement in cables, satellite development must
go forward, and in the long run, communications satellites will con-
stitute an essential part of any global communications system.
With this background we turn to the principal types of
communications satellites which have been placed in orbit. These
may be divided into two categories-the passive and the active.
Preliminarily, the popular misconception that before long satellites
will be broadcasting directly into the home should be corrected. It
is not expected that such broadcasting by satellite will become tech-
nically feasible for at least another decade. 7 The types of satellites
in operation today are all of the relay type, i.e., they broadcast not
directly to the home receiver, but rather through a ground station
which in turn transmits to the home by ordinary communication
media, for example, a telephone switchboard or a television station's
transmitter.
A. The Passive Satellite
The passive satellite is one which merely acts as a large radio wave
reflector or mirror. Essentially, the passive system consists of (1) a
powerful transmitter on earth which simply "bounces" a signal off
the surface of the satellite, and (2) a station on earth which has large
movable antennas .and sensitive receivers to receive the reflected
signal.8
Potentially, passive satellites are very reliable,9 because they have
no electronics which can fail; and a single satellite can be "used"
by many ground stations simultaneously provided, of course, differ-
ent frequencies are available for use. On the other hand, passive
satellites only reflect signals; they do not amplify them. Therefore,
for high volume usage such satellites require expensive and powerful
6. Newsweek, March 16, 1964, p. 88. By suitable satellite facilities, AT&T explained,
it meant circuits that are satisfactory in quality and having costs bearing a reasonable
relationship to alternative methods of getting the circuits.
7. Address by Jaffe, Communications Satellites, The First World Conference on
World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 3, 1963.
8. The first demonstration of the passive communications satellite technique occurred
in 1958, when United States scientists carried on a trans-continental two-way voice
conversation using the moon as the relay point for the reflected signals. Subsequently,
NASA's Project Echo utilized the first man-made passive communications satellite.
9. Echo I, a 100-foot metalized balloon, was launched by NASA in August 1960.
Many successful experiments were conducted with it. Although now shriveled and
dented after four years in space, it can still be seen with the naked eye. Echo II,
which is 135 feet in diameter and made of a heavier, stiffer material, was launched
in January 1963; it is still in use and can also be seen with the naked eye.
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ground transmitters and ultra-sensitive ground receivers, and even
then the satellite's return signal becomes weak at altitudes over 2,000
miles. Hence, if the passive reflector satellite is to be employed, it
will be for relatively low-volume traffic.
B. The Active Satellite
The active satellite, unlike the passive type, contains electronic
equipment for receiving radio signals from the earth. The active
satellite amplifies the signal and retransmits it back to a ground station,,
serving the same purpose as a microwave tower would if it were
possible to construct one of sufficient height.10
AT&T's "Telstar," which provided the first trans-Atlantic television
transmission, and Radio Corporation of America's (RCA's) "Relay,"
which was used to televise to Europe the launching of Astronaut
L. Gordon Cooper, are both active relay satellites."
Active satellites under consideration today are of two types: the
medium altitude satellite and the fixed, or synchronous, high altitude
satellite.
1. The Medium Altitude Type.-The medium altitude satellite for
a commerical system is one which is placed in orbit from 5,000 to
10,000 miles above the earth. Telstar and Relay are both examples
of this type.'2
It is estimated that to maintain a continuous global communications
service system using a medium altitude type of satellite (at an ap-
proximate height of 6,000 miles) would require a minimum of 12
10. The era of active communications satellites began in December 1958, with
the Army Signal Corps' Project Score. A pre-recorded Christmas message by Presi-
dent Eisenhower was transmitted to earth from the satellite for 12 days. Although
very limited in capability, Project Score was successful in proving the concept. In
1960, the United States launched its second active satellite, "Courier," a "delayed
repeater" satellite which received a message and stored it on tapes while in view of
one ground station and, at a later time when in view of another ground station,
retransmitted the message to the ground.
11. For descriptions of Telstar, see Felker, Telestar Project, PROCEDmiNS 181;
Findley, Telephone a Star, National Geographic, May 1962, pp. 638-51. For a de-
scription of Project Relay, see Address by Metzger and Schreimer, Project Relay,
American Rocket Society, 17th Annual Meeting and Space Flight Exposition, Los
Angeles, Nov. 13-18, 1962. Although Relay and Telstar were designed for similar
capabilities, they differ in electronic circuitry and in two other respects: the com-
munications transmitter of Relay has a power output four times as high as Telstar and
Relay carries two complete communications transponders, both of which may be
used in identical fashion.
12. Telstar I was launched on July 10, 1962. It ceased operating after four and one-
half months because of radiation damage. Testar II was launched on May 7, 1963. It
failed to responded to commands after two and one-half months for undetermined
reasons, but was reactivated subsequently for an additional period. Relay I was launched
on December 13, 1962 and set a new record for performance and durability. Relay II
was launched on January 21, 1964 and transmitted the first live television broadcast
from Japan on March 19, 1964. Relay II was still broadcasting as of this writing.
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satellites, if spacing between the satellites is controlled through equip-
ment within the satellites, and a minimum of 18 satellites if the
satellites travel in random orbits. The reason for this relatively large
number is to ensure that, as one satellite disappears over the horizon,
another will come within range of each set of two communicating
ground stations. In addition, to provide continuous communications,
each earth terminal must have at least two antennas, so that as one
antenna follows or tracks the satellite to the horizon, the second
antenna would begin to communicate via another satellite as that
satellite comes into view.
One disadvantage of the medium altitude system is that the
ground stations are more complicated and expensive than in the
synchronous system. Another is the radiation damage at low altitudes,
a condition which rendered Telstar I inoperable. On the other hand,
a significant advantage of the medium altitude system is that with
many satellites in orbit, the system can continue to operate, although
on a reduced basis, even if several of the satellites fail for mechanical
reasons or because of radiation damage.
2. The Synchronous Type.-The other type of active satellite is the
fixed, or synchronous, high altitude type.13 This satellite is placed
in orbit at 22,300 miles above the earth. At that altitude the speed
of the satellite in orbit matches the speed of the earth's rotation on
its axis. Consequently, such a satellite will have an orbit of twenty-
four hours. If placed over the equator, the satellite will appear to
remain fixed at a point in space in relation to the earth's surface in
the manner of an enormously high relay tower. This means that the
satellite is always visible from the same points on the earth's surface,
and therefore, continuously available for communications.
As previously mentioned, increasing the altitude of a satellite
enlarges the area over which it is visible to ground stations for com-
munication-relay purposes. At the 22,300 mile altitude, three satellites
spaced at approximately one-hundred-twenty degree intervals would
provide coverage over virtually the entire world (except the polar
regions).
The major advantages of the synchronous system are (1) that it
requires few satellites to provide world-wide coverage, and (2)
that since synchronous satellites remain in the same area over the
globe, this system permits simpler ground stations, there being no
need for the expensive precision-built tracking antennas required to
maintain uninterrupted service in the case of the medium altitude
satellite. On the other hand, the synchronous satellite itself is far
13. For a description of the synchronous type, see Adler, Synchronous Orbit Com-
munications Satellites, PROCEEDImNS 187-91.
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more complicated than the medium type. Moreover, there is still
some question whether in some respects, the synchronous satellite
can provide the desired quality of telephone service.
The first experimental synchronous satellite (Syncom I) was
launched on February 14, 1963 and failed to operate.14 In July and
August, 1963, NASA launched its second synchronous satellite, Syn-
com II. Unlike Syncom I, Syncom II has a good record of perform-
ance, having completed more than 2500 hours of communication time
by August 15, 1964. As this article goes to press, Syncom III has just
been launched.15
All of this technological development has been quite remarkable,
especially when we realize that the first specific satellite possibilities
were presented less than a decade ago.16 However, scientific develop-
ment was so rapid that early in 1961, it became apparent that inter-
national communication by means of satellites would be entirely
feasible. With this knowledge came the realization that the establish-
ment of a world-wide space communications system under United
States leadership was entitled to high priority, and the government
concentrated on legislation designed to make this possible. 1'7
III. THE COMmUNiCATIONs SATELLrmE ACT OF 1962
In the working out of communications satellite legislation, certain
salient facts had to be considered. In the first place, the American
14. The launching was nearly perfect and the satellite was placed in an elliptical
orbit, the peak altitude of which was about 22,300 miles. At that point, the on-board
rocket was to be fired, adding enough velocity to keep the satellite at the synchronous
altitude. However, approximately twenty seconds after the on-board rocket was
fired, all signals ceased and Syncom I has been silent since.
15. Syncom III was launched on August 19, 1964. If successfully positioned, it will
be made available to transmit Olympic television from Japan. Under the plan, which
is being coordinated by CSC, the TV signals will be sent from a Japanese ground station
near Tokyo, relayed by Syncom III over the Pacific, and received at the Naval Missile
Center at Point Mugu, California, which will serve as the Pacific coast ground station.
The signals will then be sent by microwave to the Los Angeles facilities of the Bell
Telephone system where the video transmission will be made available for distribution
to participants in the project. The project will be financed initially by the Radio Corpo-
ration of America and the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. National Broadcasting
Company, Inc., will carry on its national television network, and also make available to
other networks, the opening ceremonies. News Release, Office of the White House Press
Secretary, July 22, 1964; FCC Report No. 1586, July 22, 1964. It should be noted,
however, that Syncom III was not basically designed for television transmission and
the quality of the picture from Japan will not be comparable to that which is expected
in the global commercial communications satellite system. Communications Satellite
Corporation, First Report to Shareholders, August 3, 1964 p. 12.
16. The idea of communications satellites appears to have been first advanced by
Arthur C. Clarke, a science writer, in an article published in The Wireless Wires in
1945. See Pierce, Communications Satellites, Scientific American, October 1961, p. 90.
17. For comment on the background leading up to the enactment of the Communica-
tions Satellite Act of 1962, see Moulton, Communications Satellites-The Proposed
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 18 Bus. LAw. 173, 174-75 (1962).
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communications industry has traditionally been in the hands of private
companies, both domestically and internationally. Private industry
in this country, therefore, has a very large stake in a satellite system;
it has developed a great deal of competence in the communications
satellite field and has made substantial contributions to its develop-
ment.
At the same time, the government has its own stake. As Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, has
stated, the government's interests include "dedication to scientific
progress in space, the control over the launching facilities and air
space used for access to space and the .. responsibility to encourage
satellite communications in order to improve communications among
nations and assist in their economic development, which have long
been major objectives of United States foreign policy."'
8
After protracted Congressional hearings19 the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962,20 an imaginative and creative piece of legislation,
finally emerged.
The best expression of the policy and purposes of the Act is con-
tained in the Act itself, in the following words:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States
to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as
expeditiously as practicable a commercial communications satellite system,
as part of an improved global communications network, which will be
responsive to public needs and national objectives, which will serve the
communication needs of the United States and other countries, and which
will contribute to world peace and understanding.2 '
Congress additionally provided that such services should be pro-
18. Address by Katzenbach, Communications Satellites, The First World Conference
on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 3, 1963, Doc. No. T7/45, p. 2. See
also Katzenbach, Address on Communications Satellite Legislation, 7 ANTITRUST BULL.
421 (1962).
19. Four committees held hearings on the proposed legislation: the Senate Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences Committee on February 27 and 28 and March 1, 5, 6,
and 7, 1962, S. REP. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee on March 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 22, 1962, H.R.
REP. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); the Senate Commerce Committee on
April 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 24, and 26, 1962, S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1962,
S. REP. No. 1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Hearings on related matters were
also held by the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business, the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the House Science and
Astronautics Committee.
20. 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 701 (Supp. IV, 1963).
21. 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 701(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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vided to economically less developed countries, that all authorized
users should have nondiscriminatory access to the system, and that
competition in the providing of communications services to the public
should be maintained and strengthened. 2
The entity to bring about these objectives is the Communications
Satellite Corporation, popularly known as COMSAT or CSC,23 whose
organization and proposed method of operation are unique.
One theme running through the Act is that of a working partner-
ship between the corporation and certain specified governmental
agencies. Concerning matters of internal management and operation
and essentially commercial transactions, the corporation is given the
broad powers usually enjoyed by private enterprises. At the same
time several government agencies are assigned the role of assuring
that the national policy and the public purposes which led to the
creation of the corporation are carried out.
Thus, the incorporators, who became the initial board of directors,
were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and even after the corporation has issued its capital stock,2
three directors are to be appointed by the President. 2 The remaining
twelve directors will then be elected by the shareholders: (1) six by
the communications common carriers which have purchased shares,
the expectation being that such carriers will own fifty per cent, the
maximum allowed them under the Act, and (2) six by shareholders
other than communications carriers, of whom no one shareholder
may own more than ten per cent of the shares and foreigners may not
own, in the aggregate, more than twenty per cent of the shares.2
The government's participation in regulation, and in a few instances
in control, is extensive, as is seen from the following examples:
The President is to aid in the planning, development, and execution,
and to provide for continuous review, of a national program for a
communications satellite system and to exercise such supervision as
may be appropriate to assure that the corporation's activities shall be
consistent with the national interest and foreign policy.2 7 The State
22. 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 701(b)(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
23. Of these short-form designations, CSC will be principally used throughout this
article.
24. CSC made its offering of ten million shares on June 2, 1964. For details on
ownership of CSC stock see notes 72, 73, infra.
24. 76 Stat. 423 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 732 (Supp. IV, 1963).
25. 76 Stat. 423 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 733(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
26. Ibid. However, pursuant to provisions of the Articles of Incorporation, the
Board of CSC established 1% as the maximum percentage of shares that may be owned
by any shareholder other than an authorized carrier. CSC and the FCC are in dis-
agreement as to whether such action is subject to FCC review.
27. 76 Stat. 421 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 721(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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Department is to advise the corporation on relevant foreign policy
considerations2 and to exercise certain specific powers.9
NASA is to furnish the corporation, on a reimbursable basis, with
satellite launching and associated services for the establishment and
operation of the system and for research and development, and is to
consult and cooperate with the corporation in these fields °
Quite naturally, the Federal Communications Commission is given
a wide variety of duties and responsibilities. Thus, the Commission
prescribes accounting regulations, engages in rate-making procedures,
and authorizes the corporation to issue additional shares of stock and
to borrow money. The Commission is also directed to insure non-
discriminatory use of, and equitable access to, the system under just
and reasonable charges and classifications; to approve technical
characteristics of the system; to grant authorizations for the construc-
tion and operation of satellite terminal stations; and to insure the
compatibility of the system with existing communications facilities.3 '
As to its operations the primary purpose of CSC is, of course, to
construct, own, and operate a commercial communications satellite
system, which it may do by itself or jointly with foreign entities. In
addition, it may lease channels to authorized carriers, foreign and
domestic, and it may also own and operate ground terminal stations
when licensed by the FCC.-
Although, under the Act, CSC is authorized to furnish channels of
communication to authorized users other than common carriers, the
understanding is that CSC will deal only with communications carriers
serving as a "common carrier's common carrier"33 , and that the cus-
28. 76 Stat. 426 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 742 (Supp. IV, 1963).
29. 76 Stat. 421 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 721(c) (3) (Supp. IV, 1963).
30. 76 Stat. 421 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 721(b) (Supp. IV, 1963). CSC has taken the
position that it should not be required to pay, compensate, or reimburse NASA for
expenditures in research and development conducted for the benefit of CSC, but not
expressly requested by it. The basis for this position is, inter alia, that NASA research
and development in the satellite communications field and related areas is essential
if NASA is to carry out its own responsibilities under the Communications Satellite
Act, as well as under National Aeronautics and Space Act, and that such continued
research by NASA, without reimbursement from other sources, was clearly envisioned
at the time of the passage of the Act. See Hearings on H.R. 5466 Before the Sub-
Committee of the House Committee on Science and Aeronautics on Application and
Tracking and Data Acquisition, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4, at 3328-3333 (1963).
31. 76 Stat. 419 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 721(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
32. 76 Stat. 425 (1962), 47 U.S.C. 735 (Supp. IV, 1963).
33. Address by Ford (FCC Commissioner), Commercial Communications Satellite
System, The Inter-American Bar Association, XIII Conference, Panama City, Panama,
April 19-26, 1963, p. 5. See also address by E. William Henry (Chairman of the FCC),
delivered before the Standing Committee on Communications, American Bar Asso-
ciation, August 14, 1963 (FCC Memo. 39827), p. 7.
[VOL. 17
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
tomer will continue to deal with the common carriers in the usual
way.4
IV. THE EsTABLisHMENT OF A GLOBAL SYSTEM
In working out the international framework of a global system, the
United States has been faced with the difficult task of achieving agree-
ment on a new and unique development among nations with different
resources, different priorities, and different aspirations in this field.
Unfortunately, present day sources of international law are not too
helpful, offering at best only analogies. 35 Evolving rules and establish-
ing procedures for the operation of a global communications satellite
system will be a difficult and complex task, calling for what has been
aptly termed "creative statesmanship at all levels of endeavor."3 6
A. International Radio Frequency Allocation
A threshold problem involves the crucial matter of international
radio frequency allocation. Only selected frequencies within the
radio spectrum are available for use in connection with communica-
tions between space vehicles on the one hand and earth or ground
stations on the other. A prerequisite to the establishment of a global
commercial communications satellite system is that there be adequate
frequency allocation on a basis technically feasible and generally
acceptable to the nations of the world.
This problem is one entrusted to the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (ITU), a special agency affiliated with the United
Nations. In the field of telecommunications, the ITU acts as the
general agent for allocation of the radio frequency spectrum for
different types of uses.37
In 1959, when the ITU delegates met at Geneva, they provisionally
allocated certain frequencies to be used on an experimental basis for
space communications. However, anticipating the notable growth and
development of communications satellites, the delegates at Geneva in
1959 recommended that an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Con-
34. Address by Marks, Communications-The Lifeline of Civilization, The First
World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 3, 1963.
35. Address by Segal, Communications Satellites-Pathways to International Under-
standing, The First World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece,
July 3, 1963.
36. Address by Katzenbach, The Development of Law for Outer Space, The
Chicago Planetarium Society, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 7, 1961, p. 5.
37. For a comprehensive review of the background of the ITU and the various
international telecommunication conferences, see Glazer, The Law-Making Treaties of
the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space, 60 MICH.
L. REv. 269 (1962); Glazer, Infelix ITU-The Need For Space-Age Revision To the
International Telecommunication Convention, 23 FED. B.J. 1 (1963); see also generally,
CODDING, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION: AN EXPERmlENT IN
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1952); Estep and Kearse, Space Communications and
the Law: Adequate International Control After 1963?, 60 MicH. L. REv. 873 (1960).
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ference of the ITU on Space Radio Communications (EARC) be
convened in 1963, primarily for the purpose of assigning the
frequencies necessary for all categories of space communication
services. This Conference was held in Geneva in October and
November, 1963, and was attended by representatives of seventy
nations. The Conference allocated radio frequency bands for com-
munications satellites and for other space communication services
involving use of the frequency spectrum. 2500 to 2700 megacycles
of frequency space were allocated to communications satellites on
a shared basis with radio services, and two 50 megacycle bands on
an exclusive basis.38 The treaty resulting from this conference was
ratified by the United States Senate in March, 1964.
The resolution of the radio frequency question was, of course, a
sine qua non to the establishment of any global system. Beyond that,
however, there still remain broad and complex problems involved in
establishing a usable global communications system.
B. International Organization of a Global System
The initial level for possible international participation in a com-
munications satellite system is in the decisions on key issues relating
to the establishment of the system-such as the selection of a system,
the type of system, its design, the scope of the system, and its
financing. Such questions are not merely matters of technique or
detail. They involve factors of tremendous cost and may affect the
whole course of a global communications system.39 Even so space-
capable a nation as the United States, which has spent many millions
of dollars in initial development of communications satellites, has not
yet been able to work out all of its own answers as to which of the ap-
proaches to a communications satellite system is most desirable.
Obtaining extensive international participation in the initial stages of
establishing a global communications satellite system affords the prag-
matic advantage of insuring, at the outset, the existence of the broad
base which appears to be necessary to make the system successful.
38. Allocations obtained at the Conference, although not in all cases those proposed
by the United States, are believed to be of sufficient quantity and quality to accom-
modate the requirements presently projected by the United States. REPORT TO T1E
CONGRESS Ftom THE PRFsiDENT OF THE UNrrED STATES ON UNITED STATES AERONAU-
Tics ArN SPACE AcvrrsTs DnG 1963, Jan. 27, 1964.
39. Dr. Leonard Jaffe, Director, Communications Systems, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, has pointed out that within the basic choices of number, altitude
and kind of satellite, there lies "an extraordinary number of alternatives, each of
which must be put to the test of cost, complexity, feasibility, and reliability . . . and
nearly every choice changes the factors involved in every other choice. Behind each
technical decision is a long series of tradeoffs of weight, of cost, of reliability, of
service, etc." Address by Jaffe, Communications Satellites, The First World Conference
on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 3, 1963.
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However, there are also disadvantages to international participation
in the basic choices. It is obvious that few nations have the technical
competence at the present time to make meaningful contributions to
decisions bearing on the establishment of the system.40 Even space-
capable nations do not see eye-to-eye on many important technical
aspects, and the resolution of differences among the participants in-
volves possibilities of delay. The International Telephone and Tele-
graph Consultative Committee (CCITT), 41 for example, has pro-
visionally recommended technical time specifications which might
well rule out the use of synchronous satellites except over communica-
tion links for which no alternative means of communication can be
provided, a decision which United States experts consider un-
warranted.43 Furthermore, participation in the key initial decisions
leading up to the establishment of a system could create a complex
of difficult politico-strategic problems, especially where participating
nations have different ideologies and pursue different objectives in
the establishment of a system. Unfortunately, progress in outer space
cannot yet be divorced from politics in inner space.
The United States has thus been faced with uneasy alternatives. If
it had deferred the establishment of a system until full international
participation could be worked out, the pace of the technological
development would inevitably have suffered and the risk of another
country's coming out with a competing development would also have
been incurred." On the other hand, if the United States had by itself
made all the key decisions on the establishment of a communications
satellite system and had then offered the result to other nations on
what would have been essentially a "take it or leave it" basis, other
40. The fact that a nation has not itself achieved a highly developed technology does
not mean, of course, that it may not wish to participate in these initial decisions. A
non-space-capable nation may believe that participation in the initial stages may offer
a variety of values, such as prestige, the opportunity to train scientists, a forum to
advance the nation's economic interests, insurance against being bypassed later on, or
any number of other socio-economic-political benefits. The pros and cons of foreign
participation in the key decisions are ably set forth in Schwartz & Goldsen, Foreign
Participation in Communications Satellite Systems: Implication of the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962, The Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-3484-RC (February
1963).
41. One of the permanent organs of the International Telecommunication Union.
42. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Communication Satellite
Act of 1962-The First Year, H.R. Riap. No. 809, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
43. At a technical session on Syncom II, held by the Institute of Electrical &
Electronic Engineers in New York in March 1964, officials of the Army's Satellite
Communications Agency, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, delivered papers which pre-
sented the conclusion that voice communications using a synchronous satellite system
are not hampered by the approximately six-tenths of a second round trip time delay.
44. For example, there have been numerous indications from Soviet sources that a
communications satellite program has a high priority in Soviet planning and is in
the development stages. See Clesner, Soviet Space Communications Expectations, 44
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 398 (1963) for a collection of such sources.
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nations might well have decided to "leave it." Such unilateral action
might have jeopardized the requisite broad base and might also have
driven other nations to pursue competing systems. At the least the
opportunity for a truly international development might have been
jeopardized.
Until about a year ago, these alternatives did not have to be faced
squarely because the United States itself was not far enough along in
its technology to require decisions on the key issues concerning the
type and nature of communications satellite systems to be established.
Wisely, while the United States was proceeding with its techno-
logical development, it undertook constructive measures to enlarge
the ambit of international cooperation in this area. Thus, the United
States regularly afforded other nations the opportunity to participate
in space communication experiments and even invited foreign
scientists into its laboratories. 45 Further, the United States encouraged
other nations to join with it in important experimental projects in
satellite communications. In April 1961, the United States entered into
agreements with France and England4 and in November 1962, with
Japan4 7 to cooperate in the testing of the experimental communica-
tions satellites, Relay and Rebound,4 both launched by NASA. All
three of these countries have made ground stations available for test
demonstrations of telephone, radio, and television through domestic
telecommunications networks.
The United States also took the initiative in seeking to establish
cooperative relationships with the Soviet Union.49 Following an ex-
change of views between the Chairman of the Soviet Council of
Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, and President John F. Kennedy, Dr.
Hugh L. Dryden of the United States NASA and Academician A. A.
Blagonravov of the USSR Academy of Sciences were designated by
their respective countries to explore the possibilities of cooperation
in various areas of space endeavor including communications satel-
45. For example, under a Memorandum of Understanding dated March 29, 1961,
between the United States and France, NASA agreed to accommodate, in its space
science centers, technicians sponsored by the French Comite des Recherches Spaticles
(Committee for Space Research). See Documents on Outer Space 192-93; see also
NASA News Release 71-71, March 20, 1961.
46. NASA News Release 61-62, April 4, 1961.
47. NASA News Release 62-238, November 6, 1962.
48. Relay and Rebound were research and development projects to demonstrate the
feasibility of basic concepts and technological apparatus and to evaluate various
systems to be employed in communications satellites.
49. President John F. Kennedy, in his Message to Congress on the State of the
Union, January 30, 1961, stated that "this administration intends to explore promptly
all possible areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other nations to invoke
the wonders of science instead of its terrors. . . . Both nations would help themselves
as well as other nations by removing these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful
competition of the cold war." Documents on Outer Space 184.
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lites. As a result of meetings held in Geneva in 1962, during sessions
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, an agreement was worked out and finally signed in September,
1963, providing for Soviet-United States cooperation in experiments
on communications by means of the United States' satellite Echo
A-12.50 The agreement also provides that the Soviet Union and the
United States shall further consider joint experiments using active
satellites that may be launched by either nation in the future, in-
cluding the mutual exchange of information on the results of such ex-
periments. Perhaps most significant is a provision for discussions of
"the working out with other nations of a project for an experimental
global system of space communications with due regard to the recom-
mendations of the ITU."5'
However, by the latter half of 1963 the technical development of
the United States had advanced so rapidly that the establishment of
a commercial communications satellite system for use in 1966 appeared
feasible.5 2 The time was suddenly at hand for many of the key deci-
sions, and the question of whether those decisions were to await inter-
national participation had to be faced squarely.
The decision-shared in by the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion and the Government-was to go forward with the development of
an operational communications satellite system, whether or not the
basis for international participation had been established by the
time the system became operational, while at the same time con-
tinuing energetic efforts to secure participation by other nations. One
rationale for this decision may have been the view that scientific
progress has a priori values of its own which compel going forward
notwithstanding the possible adverse effects on achieving international
cooperation.53 A more pragmatic rationale is that this is an age when
the prestige, as well as the economic advantage of achieving scientific
priorities is considered vital in the struggle between competing
ideologies5 4 The Communications Satellite Corporation interpreted
50. United States Mission to United Nations, Press Release 4614, December 6, 1962,
pp. 1-4. For the text of the Agreement, see Documents on Outer Space 273-77.
51. For the suggestion that Soviet strategy calls for the use of an international
scientific conference merely as a means of developing "auxiliary" sources of interna-
tional law to support the Soviet view of "peaceful co-existence," see Crane, Soviet
Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685, 720-24 (1962).
52. See REPORT OF COMMUNICATONS SATELLrrE CoRPoRATON, H.R. REP. No. 809,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF SATELLrrE CoRPoRA-
TION].
53. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences on Testimony of Scientists on Goals of the Nation's Space Program, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 118, 122-23, 143 (1963).
54. See REPORT OF TsE HOUSE COMIMITEE ON SCIENCE AND AsTRoNAUTIcs, The




its mandate from Congress to require the attainment for the United
States of that priority in the field of communications satellites.-, In
short, the possible consequences of waiting too long were regarded
as more costly than the consequences of proceeding too rapidly.
The decision of the Communications Satellite Corporation to press
forward rapidly was publicly revealed on December 22, 1963, when
CSC formally invited fifteen qualified American firms to submit pro-
posals for contracts for the design of satellites for a commercial com-
munications satellite system.m The request was directed toward the
establishment of a "basic system" for CSC which could include either
satellite design for a "medium altitude" system or one employing
synchronous satellites.57 The design for the medium altitude system
was required to be one which provided global coverage not later than
1967. For the synchronous system, the date for global coverage was
1968.
After evaluation of the proposals, which were submitted in Febru-
ary 1964,58 CSC stated that it would award contracts for the design
of satellites of more than one type to be completed within six months.5 9
On the basis of the completed design, a system design will be chosen
55. In a position paper presented by NASA to the Senate Committee on Aeronau-
tical and Space Sciences, Dr. Leonard Jaffe, Director of Communications System of
NASA, stated:
"The development and full exploitation of the possibilities of communications satellite
systems are immensely important to the Nation's economy and to its prestige.
"Although the United States has pioneered in this field and demonstrated its
feasibility to the world, the U.S. position of leadership will soon be lost if we do not
press ahead vigorously in the establishment of the first operational system, and if we
are not the ones to indicate the direction for continuing improvement and extension
of the services and capabilities.
"Not only will the Nation's economy benefit from the use of communications satellites
and the revenues produced by their use, but it must be recognized that the potential
foreign market for equipment will turn to the leading nation in this new technology.
"To insure that the United States does indeed retain the leadership that it now
enjoys, the planning, the organization, the establishment of operational systems, and
the continued advances in the technology must be supported and nurtured carefully
by both private interests and all of the agencies of government concerned."
Hearings on S. 1245 Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical & Space Sciences,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 421-22 (1963).
56. Public Release of the Communications Satellite Corporation of December 22,
1963; see also Broadcasting, December 30, 1963, p. 48, col. 1-2.
57. The request for proposals set forth specific criteria and basic minimum require-
ments for the satellites of a commercial system, including requirements with respect
to telecommunications capacity, in-orbit operating lifetime, and suitability for launching
by designated types of launch vehicles.
58. The following proposals were submitted: AT&T and RCA jointly for the design
of a medium altitude random system; Philco Corporation also for a medium altitude
random system; International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (ITT) and Space
Technology Laboratories, Inc. (STL) jointly for a medium altitude controlled system;
Hughes Aircraft for a synchronous satellite system.
59. On June 8, 1964, CSC announced it would award contracts for six months design
studies. The team of AT&T and RCA will design a random orbit medium altitude
satellite system calling for eighteen satellites to be placed in random orbits 6,000 miles
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and CSC will award contracts for the manufacture of satellites.
Under this program CSC expected that the initial implementation of a
commercial communications satellite system would take place in 1966.
Moving ahead even more rapidly, in February 1964, CSC an-
nounced a further program for the launching in 1965 of one or more
synchronous satellites on an experimental-operation basis to provide
communication channels between terminal states in North America
and Western Europe for the purpose of gathering data relevant to
the design of a full commercial system.60 At the same time, CSC
announced its intention to negotiate a contract for such a satellite with
Hughes Aircraft Company. Subsequently, an agreement was con-
cluded with Hughes for delivery of two such satellites in 1965, one
by the spring of that year.61
The decision to move ahead with the establishment of the system
did not mean that CSC gave up, or even slackened, its efforts to work
out arrangements with foreign governments and business entities
for participation by them in the establishment and operation of the
system.
These efforts had begun early in 1963 when Leo D. Welch, board
chairman and chief executive officer, and Joseph V. Charyk, president
of CSC, held exploratory talks with communications officials of
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden and Japan, in an effort to interest them in the setting
up of a global system. Mr. Charyk reported that each of the countries
manifested a desire to participate.u
In the late summer of 1963, CSC drew up a statement of principles
for a global system for presentation to foreign nations or their de-
signated telecommunications entities. The principles were reviewed
with representatives of the President, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, the FCC, NASA, and other appropriate gov-
high. STL with ITT as the principal subcontractor will design a medium altitude system
calling for twelve satellites to be placed in a "controlled orbit." Hughes will engage
in additional studies with respect to an improved synchronous-type satellite. New York
Times, June 9, 1964, p. 29; Electronic News, June 15, 1964, p. 13.
60. Business Week, February 22, 1964, p. 78. These satellites would have a design
capacity for operations between appropriately equipped terminal stations of up to
240 two-way telephone channels which could also be utilized for facsimile data or
telegraphic message traffic or for black and white television transmissions.
61. On June 22, 1964, CSC filed an application with the FCC for authority to
modify the earth station at Andover, Maine, pursuant to an agreement with AT&T, to
enable the station to work with the synchronous satellite which CSC plans to launch
in the spring of 1965 to provide voice, record or television transmission from North
America to Europe. The station, as modified, is intended to be used by CSC to trans-
mit communications to and from earth stations at Goonhilly Downs, United Kingdom;
Pleumeur Bodou, France; Raisting, West Germany; and Fucino, Italy, on the basis of
arrangements to be worked out with the foreign participants. CSC News Release,
June 22, 1964. FCC approval was received on July 29, 1964.
62. REPoRT OF SATELiTE CoRPoRATiON 6.
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ernment officials and also with representatives of the American
communications carriers. As a result of these discussions, certain
revisions were made.63 The CSC proposal was then discussed with
the foreign nations, or their telecommunication entities, which are
expected to be the principal participants in the global satellite
communications system.6 As these discussions have proceeded, the
participation by the Department of State has increased.
The discussions with foreign nations which took place in the latter
part of 1963 and early 1964 quite naturally resulted in some refine-
ments and revisions in the CSC proposal.65 In general, the proposal,
as it shaped up early in 1964, called for a system comprised of a
single space segment and multiple ground segments. The space seg-
ment was to consist of the communications satellites and the various
facilities required to operate them. A ground segment would consist
of the various ground facilities needed to utilize the allocation of
satellite services to a country or group of countries.
The CSC proposal called for ownership of the space segment by
the participating countries (or their communications entities) with
shares allocated to each owner based upon its share of world com-
munications traffic and upon its anticipated use of the system.66 A key
element of the CSC proposal was that CSC was to have the essential
responsibility for the development of the system and for management
and maintenance of the space segment, although certain major deci-
sions relating to design, establishment and operation would require
the concurrence of some of the other space segment owners.
Apparently recognizing the reluctance of some foreign nations to
enter into a definitive arrangement which vested so much control in
CSC, the proposal was not offered by CSC as the ultimate arrangement
for the global system but only as an interim arrangement among
prospective participants prepared to make immediate investment
commitments in the system.
63. Ibid.
64. In a report to the Chairman of the Committee on Interstate & Foreign Com-
merce, dated September 20, 1963, the State Department, in referring to the statement
of principles developed by CSC for participation by CSC and foreign nations in a
global system, stated: "The principles will be presented as those developed by the
corporation and the reaction of the Europeans will be considered highly important in
the formulation of the final Government position on the same subjects." H.R. RE',.
No. 809, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1963).
65. While all of the details of the proposal were not made public, the general out-
line of the plan was disclosed. See, e.g., id. at 6; Katzenbach, Communications Satellites,
supra note 18; New York Times, September 29, 1963, p. 1, col. 2; Newsweek, March
16, 1964, pp. 87-88.
66. The designated entity could be a private or public entity. In the case of the




Early in 1964 a major advance in the negotiations took place. By
that time it must have become clear to foreign nations that from a
technological viewpoint, CSC would undoubtedly be able to establish
a communications satellite system within a relatively short time and
that CSC was prepared, if necessary, to finance the entire system
without foreign participation. In short, CSC made plain that it did
not intend to permit prolonged international discussions to delay
its plans to place a workable commercial system into operation as
soon as feasible.67 At the same time it also became clear to foreign
telecommunications entities that if CSC were able to provide suitable
satellite circuits by 1966 or early 1967, American communications
carriers would not place additional cables in service, preferring to
use satellite circuits instead.68
These factors appear to have hastened the course of the discussions.
A significant breakthrough occurred in January 1964, when at a
private meeting of a special satellite committee of the European Con-
ference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, Great
Britain, which had previously expressed its reluctance to participate
in the satellite system, modified its position. A representative of the
British Post Office, which until then had stood as the champion of
cables over satellites, not only came out in favor of British participa-
tion in the ownership and use of a satellite system, but urged prompt
decisions by European nations. 69 Other key nations also publicly
voiced their intention to participate in the satellite system.
Accordingly, during the first half of 1964, CSC officials and repre-
sentatives of the State Department continued to work out the basis for
an interim agreement with foreign participants, particularly with
respect to those nations which were prepared to make immediate
investments in the space segment of the proposed communications
satellite system.
By the time CSC issued its Preliminary Prospectus in May, 1964,
for a public offering of 200 million dollars of CSC stock,7 the interim
arrangements with foreign participants had progressed far enough to
67. Statement Prepared for Presentation to the Military Operations Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations, by Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, Presi-
dent of CSC, March 24, 1964.
68. See note 6 supra.
69. Electronic News, April 20, 1964, pp. 1, 19. That CSC's decision to launch a
commercial satellite by 1965 was material to Great Britain's statement is evident from
a statement by the Postmaster General of Great Britain that the 1965 date was some
years earlier than Great Britain had theretofore thought likely. According to the
Postmaster General, it was not practical for the United Kingdom or Europe to stand
aside from these developments. Electronic News, February 17, 1964.
70. Preliminary Prospectus, May 27, 1964.
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indicate that a viable arrangement could be effected which would
easily meet the CSC timetable.
71
CSC's first public issue was a complete success.72 The ten-million
share issue was quickly sold out, half being purchased by authorized
communication carriers and half being purchased by the general
public.73 CSC was thus assured of the availability of funds to proceed
with its program.
C. The International Agreements of July, 1964.
During the spring and early summer of this year, representatives
of the United States, fourteen European countries, and Canada,
Australia and Japan met in London and then in Washington for
intensive negotiations on the international arrangement for the sys-
tem.74 One of the controversial issues was how many votes would be
required for a controlling majority on policy issues. Another difficult
question was at what stage the "interim" arrangements proposed by
the United States should be supplanted by a formal international
organization. Both of these questions involved the concern of other
countries with the extent to which domination over the system would
be exercised by the United States.
These negotiations moved quickly and on July 24, 1964, representa-
tives of the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the Vatican City State concluded two inter-
related agreements establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global
Commercial Communications Satellite System.7 5
The first agreement is an intergovernmental one and contains the
71. The Prospectus itself contained only the barest outline of the proposed interna-
tional arrangement and did not set forth the details of the proposals then under negotia-
tion. However, the Prospectus pointedly noted that CSC intended to proceed with its
program and was prepared to finance the "entire cost of establishing the system
exclusive of the costs of foreign terminal stations." Prospectus, p. 21.
72. The public offering was oversubscribed. Brokers reported that the demand for
the stock was the greatest for any issue in history. The Washington Post, August 14,
1964, p. D7.
73. In its First Report to Shareholders, dated August 3, 1964, CSC reported that
more than 130,000 persons owned CSC stock in their own names. CSC spokesmen have
indicated that at least 50,000 other individuals hold shares in "street names." New
York Times, August 14, 1964, p. 33. The stock which was offered to the public on
June 2, 1964, at $20 per share was being traded on August 14, 1964, at around $35 per
share.
74. New York Times, July 20, 1964, pp. 1, 44.
75. The agreements were initialed ad referendum to the governments or designated
authorities as the concluding act of the Plenipotentiary Conference to Establish Interim
Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System. See De-
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organizational principles established for the system. The second
agreement, referred to as the "Special Agreement;' is one by com-
munication entities, public or private, designated by the governments
signing the first agreement. In essence, the Special Agreement deals
with carrying out commercial, financial and technical operations of
the system according to the principles established in the Intergovern-
mental Agreement.
The Intergovernmental Agreement provides that the parties shall
cooperate to establish a single global commercial communications
satellite system which is to include (1) an experimental and oper-
ational phase, in which one or more synchronous satellites are to be
placed in orbit in 1965, and (2) succeeding phases employing satel-
lites of types to be determined, with the objective of achieving basic
global coverage in the latter part of 1967.76
Ownership quotas in the space segment77 are established for each
communications entity, public or private designated by each partici-
pating government as the signatory to the Special Agreement. The
largest ownership quota is 61 per cent for the communications entity
designated by the United States, i.e., CSC. No other country even
approximates this quota; the next in size being 8.4 per cent for the
communications entity of the United Kingdom.7
The basic direction of the system is to be by an Interim Commu-
nications Satellite Committee which is to have responsibility for the
partment of State Press Release, No. 346, July 28, 1964, to which the agreements are
attached. The agreements will be open for signature in Washington beginning August
19, 1964, for a period of six months to all countries which are members of the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union.
76. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Commu-
nication Satellite System, July 28, 1964 [hereinafter cited as Agreement], art. I. The
timetable is essentially the one which had been established by CSC.
77. The term "space segment" includes the communications satellites and the tracking,
control, command and related facilities and equipment required to support the operation
of the satellites.
78. The presently assigned quotas (based on a total of 100) are as follows: Australia
(Overseas Telecommunications Commission) 2.75; Austria (Bundesministerium ffir
Verkehr und Elektrizitiitswirtschaft, Generaldirektion fiur die Postund Telegraphenver-
waltung) 0.2; Belgium (R6gie des T616graphes et T616phones) 1.1; Canada (Canadian
Overseas Telecommunication Corporation) 3.75; Denmark (Generaldirektoratet for Post
og Telegrafvesnet) 0.4; France (Government of the French Republic) 6.1; Germany
(Deutsche Bundespost) 6.1; Ireland (An Roinn Poist Agus Telegrafa) 0.35; Italy (to
be designated) 2.2; Japan (Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company Ltd.) 2.0; Netherlands
(Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 1.0; Norway (Telegrafstyret) 0.4;
Portugal (Administracao Geral dos Correios, Telegrafos e Telefones) 0.4; Spain
(Government of the State of Spain) 1.1; Sweden (Kungl. Telestyrelsen) 0.7; Switzer-
land (Direction G6n6rale des PTT) 2.0; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Her Britannic Majesty's Postmaster General) 8.4; United States of America




design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance and
operation of the space segment of the system.
Each signatory to the Special Agreement whose quota is at least
1.5 per cent will have one representative on the Interim Committee.
Two or more signatories with quotas of less than 1.5 per cent may
obtain a representative on the Committee if their combined quotas
total 1.5 per cent. Each signatory or group of signatories represented
on the Interim Committee is to have the number of votes equal to
its quota. Thus, the United States will have 61 votes, the United
Kingdom 8.4 votes, France 6.1 votes, and so on.
Since 61 votes will obviously give the United States (CSC) control
over all matters left to majority vote, the agreement provides that
on certain subjects any decision must have the "concurrence of
representatives whose total votes exceed the vote of the representa-
tive with the largest vote by not less than 12.5."19 The matters sub-
ject to this provision are the key issues likely to arise, including
choice of type or types of space segment to be established, establish-
ment of general standards for approval of earth stations for access
to the space segment, establishment of rates, approval of budgets
by major categories, placing of contracts, and approval of matters
relating to satellite launchings. On such issues, therefore, for the
position of CSC to prevail, it would have to obtain at least 12.5 other
votes. However, as to certain key issues, such as the type of space
segment to be established, if a decision is not reached in 60 days then
decision may be taken by the concurring vote of CSC and at least 8.5
other votes. 0 Since no other nation or entity has more than 8.4 votes
(the United Kingdom), CSC would have to obtain concurrence of
at least two others for its view to prevail.
Pursuant to the policies and determinations of the Interim Com-
mittee, the Agreement establishes CSC as the manager of the space
segment with respect to its design, development, construction, estab-
lishment, operation and maintenance. 81
Contributions of the signatories to the Special Agreement are
based upon an estimate of 200 million dollars with each signatory
paying a percentage according to its quota. If additional contribu-
tions are required in excess of 300 million dollars, a special con-
ference of the signatories to the Special Agreement must be convened
to recommend appropriate action. a2
The second agreement-the Special Agreement-the parties to which
are the communications entities designated by each participating
79. Agreement, art. V (c).
80. Agreement, art. V (c).
81. Agreement, art. VII.
82. Agreement, art. VI.
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country, deals with certain ,aspects of the financial arrangements,8
the items to be included as part of the cost of the space segment,84
the general rules for utilization of the space segments by earth sta-
tions,85 and the guide lines for placing of contracts. y
The Special Agreement also establishes, in a general way, the
principles to be followed in establishing the rate of charge per unit
of satellite utilization. The Agreement states that, as a general rule,
charges shall be sufficient, on the basis of the estimated cost of the
space segment, "to cover amortization of the capital cost of the
space segment, an adequate compensation for use of capital, and the
estimated operating, maintenance and administration costs of the
space segment."87 The Special Agreement also spells out in some
detail the specific functions of CSC as manager.,
The Agreements will remain open until February 19, 1965. Until
then any country which is a member of the International Telecom-
munication Union can acquire ownership on the original terms, with
its quota set by the Interim Committee. After that date a country
may obtain part ownership upon such financial conditions as the
Interim Committee shall determine. Quotas amounting to 17 per cent
ownership have been allocated for additional signatories to the Agree-
ments, with the quotas of the nineteen original members to be re-
duced proportionately as others join the system. Significantly, even
if the entire 17 per cent is allocated, the ownership quota of the
United States will still remain just above 50 per cent.
The course of these events certainly vindicates the decision of CSC
officials to press forward with the technological development of a
communications satellite system, despite the uncertain status of in-
ternational negotiations at the time. A solid interim international
arrangement has now been worked out to mesh with the timetable
for which CSC has been steadily pressing.
It bears emphasis, however, that the present arrangement is an
interim one only. Not later than January 1, 1969, the Interim Com-
mittee is to submit its recommendations for definitive arrangements. 9
That report is to be considered at an international conference, °0 with
a view to a definitive arrangement established by January 1, 1970.
During the interim period there are of course still formidable prob-
lems to be resolved. The details of the rate structure are yet to be
83. Special Agreement, art. IV.
84. Special Agreements, arts. V, VI.
85. Special Agreement, arts. 7, 8.
86. Special Agreement, art. 10.
87. Special Agreement, art. 9.
88. Special Agreement, art. 10.
89. Agreement, art. IX.
90. Agreement, art. IX.
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determined. The provisions for the letting of contracts are obviously
a compromise between the preference of this country to award con-
tracts primarily on the basis of competitive bidding and the desire
of many of the European nations for allocation of contracts on a quota
basis; obviously, this may be a continuing sensitive area. The com-
pensation for CSC as manager is still to be worked out. Many of the
space segment owners also operate competing communications facili-
ties giving rise to possible conflicts of interest. Other sensitive prob-
lems may arise out of CSC's dual responsibility to participating nations
under the international agreements and to the FCC under the Com-
munications Satellite Act. The fact that domestic communication
carriers may urge their own views on the FCC contrary to those of
CSC might create further complications. 91 Developments in these
areas will undoubtedly be carefully watched by foreign nations who
may endeavor to diminish CSC control by the time a definitive agree-
ment is evolved.
The need to work out a viable and cooperative arrangement, not
only on an interim basis but definitively, is, of course, crucial to the
ultimate success of the satellite system. Beyond that, the importance
of international cooperation in this field is further emphasized since
such achievement could provide a valuable precedent for the solution
of other problems where effective international organizational arrange-
ments may be needed.92 As Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach
has pointed out, perhaps the most valuable indirect benefit of achiev-
ing a cooperative system is that "men and nations will grow in
confidence that national aspirations whose effective realization calls
for international action need neither be abandoned nor attempted
in isolation but may be successfully undertaken together."
9 3
91. For example, on August 14, 1964, CSC filed a significant petition with the FCC
requesting that CSC be given exclusive eligibility for ownership and operation of the
initial ground stations for the communications satellite system. CSC noted that under
the Communications Satellite Act, the FCC is to decide whether CSC or other com-
mercial communications carriers, or both, should build and operate the ground stations.
However, CSC urged that the public interest would best be served by giving CSC
exclusive control over the initial ground stations.
It is likely that at least some of the communications carriers will rigorously oppose
the CSC petition and will request the FCC to allow them to obtain individual interests
in the proposed satellite system ground stations. As of the date this article went to
press, commercial communications carriers had not yet filed answers with the FCC or
otherwise publicly indicated what their position would be with respect to the CSC
petition.
92. Segal, Communications Satellites-Pathways to International Understanding, supra
note 35.
93. Katzenbach, Communications Satellites, supra note 18, at 4.
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V. PROVISION FOR UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS
While the present international arrangement is certainly a major
achievement in itself, the long run objectives of a global system
surely require that a way be found to make the benefits of the system
available to the underdeveloped nations of the world. How is this
to be accomplished? One solution might be for the financially able
nations participating in the system to provide the finances and techni-
cal assistance necessary to construct and maintain ground terminals
in other countries unable to finance or maintain such facilities for
themselves. But from the viewpoint of the underdeveloped nations,
this would hardly be a satisfactory solution. For mere access to a
global communications satellite system may not be meaningful to
a nation whose internal communications facilities are still in a
primitive stage and whose external communications links, even with
its immediate neighbors, are largely inadequate.
What is necessary is a program of economic and technical assistance
designed (1) to improve each such nation's internal communications,
(2) to improve regional communications, that is, communications
among a group of countries in the same area, and finally (3) to
provide linkage into the communications satellite system. 4
One possible method of achieving these objectives, initially at
least, would be to establish a ground terminal in an underdeveloped
region (serving two or more countries) or a limited number of ground
terminals in selected countries in an underdeveloped region. Then
all the individual countries within this region would be tied into
the system by means of conventional facilities, such as land microwave
relays or land lines which would follow the principal trade routes
between the major cities of each countryY5
This approach would have many advantages. First, it would have
a stimulating effect on the development of the internal communica-
tions of each participating country. Cities and towns along the
internal route could have access to such facilities for various com-
munications services. Second, these facilities would join the com-
munications systems of contiguous countries, encouraging and stimu-
lating increased trade among the countries and facilitating cultural
and educational exchanges. Third, such a regional system would,
in itself, provide an example of international cooperation among
neighboring nations working together toward a common goal and
with a potential for similar cooperation in other fields of endeavor.
94. See generally, Jaffe, Smith & Attaway, UNrrED STATES PAPERs 126-27; Johnson,
The Commercial Uses of Communications Satellites, THE RAND CO'aPOA-rION, pp.




Finally, the countries would be linked into the world-wide com-
munications satellite system, with all the benefits that would flow
from such a system.
Whatever program is developed to provide meaningful access for
these nations, it is manifest that the cost of doing so will be great.
Who is to bear that cost? Certainly it would be neither feasible nor
fair to impose the burden on any one nation, no matter how enthusi-
astic a sponsor of global communications it might be.
As to some underdeveloped nations, financing by institutions like
the International Bank may provide the solution. But what of nations
unable or unwilling to resort to such financing? Their access and
use would be possible only if the participating resource nations would
be willing to jointly assume the additional financial burden. Whether
a way can be found to make inclusion of the underdeveloped nations
feasible may well prove to be one of the ultimate tests of whether
a communications satellite system, truly global in scope, can be
attained.
VI. CONCLUSION
On July 3, 1963, four Americans participated in a panel discussion
of communications satellites at the First World Conference on World
Peace Through Law at Athens. They were Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Deputy Attorney-General of the United States and Co-Chairman of
the President's Ad Hoc Communications Satellite Group, Leonard
H. Marks, an incorporator and director of CSC, Leonard Jaffe, Direc-
tor, Communications System of NASA, and the writer.96 As a review
of the papers which were delivered at that time amply demonstrates,
it did not then seem possible that in only a year's time there would be
so much progress toward the perfection of an effectively operating
satellite system and so much headway in reaching agreement with
foreign nations or their telecommunications entities. As President
Johnson recently stated "this extraordinary communications medium
is moving rapidly from creative hope to actual fact."
97
These developments-with their combination of domestic and inter-
national aspects-have highlighted the need for a reappraisal of our
entire telecommunications structure and policy. The spectacular tech-
nological progress in telecommunications facilities generally, and
communications satellites specifically, necessarily affects the entire
telecommunications industry, blurring existing distinctions and out-
moding present concepts.
Over the past fifteen months, leaders of the communications in-
96. See notes 7, 18, 34, 35 supra.
97. Report of President Johnson to the Congress on Activities and Accomplishments
under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 1.
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dustry, citing the inadequacy and random character of our domestic
and international communications policies, have called for broad
evaluation and drastic changes.
General David Sarnoff, RCA Board Chairman, has proposed that
all American international telephone and telegraph facilities and
operations, both present and planned, be merged into one unified
organization within the CSC.98 He urges that this plan would offer
three far-reaching benefits to the public, as follows:
It could take maximum advantage of modem technology to achieve the
most economical and efficient use of radio frequencies, cables and satellites
to provide maximum efficiency at lowest cost to the public.
It could start with an immediate revenue base provided by the traffic of
existing United States international communications carriers. In 1962, this
totaled $160 million. This would place the Satellite Corporation on a sound
financial footing at an early date.
It could deal with equal strength, and on equal terms, with government
monopolies in foreign countries-a vitally important need in such matters
as rates, division of revenues, classes of service and facilities.
Harold S. Geneen, ITT President, has suggested instead that Con-
gress pass legislation permitting voluntary merger of international
record communications carriers to assure that "they will remain an
independent and competitive factor in the telecommunications field."99
Under this proposal, CSC would provide service to this consolidated
organization as a carrier's carrier. Mr. Geneen argues "that private
enterprise, so encouraged, can operate international communication
services more efficiently than can any resulting quasi-governmental
organization, and hence with greater customer satisfaction and at a
tax-paying profit instead of a tax-absorbing loss."
Following these proposals, E. William Henry, Chairman of the
FCC, in a comprehensive address, called for a "broad-gauged study"
of our international communications systems with a re-evaluation of
objectives and procedures. 100
Such a study would not be an easy one. It would require the efforts
and energies of all agencies of government with responsibility in
telecommunications planning or regulation, and it would need the
skill and experience of the American communications industry.
Industry and government together have brought this nation to its
present preeminence both in conventional and space communications.
98. Letter From Brigadier General David Sarnoff to Senator Warren G. Magnuson,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, June 27, 1963; see also
New York Times, May 29, 1963, p. 9, col. 1.
99. Letter From Harold S. Geneen to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, June 18, 1963.
100. Address by E. William Henry before the Standing Committee on Communica-
tions, American Bar Association, August 14, 1963 (FCC Memo. 39827).
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Surely, it is not too much to hope that continued cooperative effort
between government and industry in this dynamic field will evolve an
overall telecommunications policy and structure for the United States
which will meet the dramatic call of the future and will enable this
country to continue to provide the leadership and impetus for the
establishment of a communications satellite system encompassing all
the nations of the world.
